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BOX 2.2 CENTRAL CLEARINg COUNTERPARTIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY
Central clearing counterparties1 (CCPs) are financial entities that 
interpose themselves, in their own name, in financial instrument 
trades; they become a seller to each buyer and a buyer to each 
seller. Once a transaction is registered in the CCP, it simultaneously 
gives rise to a purchase operation and a sale operation, with both 
having the CCP as a counterparty. The CCP therefore assumes all 
the rights and obligations derived from both transactions, exposing 
itself to the counterparty risk both with the purchaser and with the 
original seller. Market risk, however, is zero. 
The CCP shields itself from counterparty risk through a set of lines 
of defence. These include strict controls to gain access to clearing 
member status (and to be able to operate as such with the CCP), 
and a series of financial resources available to cover the losses 
caused by potential default by a member. These resources are, in 
the main, provided by the members in the form of guarantees 
backing positions (initial and variation margins) and of contributions 
to a fund for defaults (through which the CCP mutualises the 
losses among all the members). The CCP set aside a buffer of its 
own capital (known as “skin in the game”), whose volume is 
relatively insignificant compared with the members’ contributions. 
Set against bilateral clearing, centralised clearing offers a series of 
potential benefits, both for participants and for the system as a 
whole. The main benefit is the enhanced capacity to reduce the 
aggregate exposure of members (and, therefore, the market and 
counterparty risk to which they are exposed) by means of the 
netting of the positions of the opposite sign that are registered in 
their name (as the CCP is counterparty to all the transactions). 
If a member defaults, netting also allows the position that is to be 
closed or transferred to be smaller, thereby lessening its potential 
impact on prices and market volatility. It also reduces the cost of 
providing collateral and capital allocation (if the member were a bank). 
Centralised clearing also simplifies processes and adds 
transparency, by replacing the complex network of market 
relationships with bilateral clearing in a system that turns on a 
single entity (see Diagram A). This makes it easier for members to 
evaluate their positions and it strengthens prudent risk 
management, given that members are mainly exposed to an entity 
that is highly supervised and regulated. 
From the standpoint of the authorities, centralised clearing 
simplifies the evaluation of market participants’ exposure and, 
therefore, provides for swift decision-making in the face of a bout 
of tension. The CCP has specific processes for managing defaults, 
and these can contribute to reducing contagion risk and domino 
effects should, for example, a large member fail. 
These advantages became manifest during the global financial 
crisis, in which centrally cleared markets proved relatively stable.2 
As a result, the G 20 leaders undertook in 2009 to require, among 
other measures, the centralised clearing of standardised OTC 
derivatives. This agreement has entailed a significant increase in 
centralised clearing activity. In 2018, for example, 76% of interest-
rate derivatives (under the swaps and FRAs categories) were 
centrally cleared, compared with 17% in 2007 (see Chart A).3 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The left panel shows a bilateral clearing network, with each arrow pointing from borrower to lender. The right panel shows a CCP network that groups for each 
member all its bilateral positions in the left panel into a single net position with the CCP. For instance, member A holds lending (borrowing) bilateral positions for 
a total of 65 (95), resulting in a net position of (30).
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1  This box is based on the article “Central Clearing Counterparties: 
benefits, costs and risks”, Nuñez S. and E. Valdeolivas, forthcoming in 
the Financial Stability Review, Banco de España (May 2019).
2  At the time of its collapse, the US bank Lehman Brothers had an 
outstanding position of $9 trillion, corresponding to 66,390 
transactions, in LCH.Clearnet Ltd (United Kingdom). This CCP 
concentrated approximately 50% of the total interest rate swaps 
market, and it had 20 members (all banks) in the swaps segment. The 
collapse was resolved through the auctioning of its positions and the 
use of the collateral provided by Lehman Brothers, without any other 
member posting losses [see Monnet, C. (2010). Let’s make it clear: 
How Central Counterparties save(d) the day, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia, Business Review Q1 2010; and Gregory, J. (2014). 
Central Counterparties: mandatory central clearing and initial margin 
requirements for OTC derivatives. John Wiley & Sons, June 2014].
3  Total interest rate derivatives account for approximately 81% of total 
traded OTC derivatives.
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BOX 2.2CENTRAL CLEARINg COUNTERPARTIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY (cont’d)
This high volume of activity, combined with the fact that CCPs 
concentrate that risk in a single entity (which can potentially be 
redistributed through the fund for defaults, for example), explains 
their systemic nature. This systematicity can, in turn, be reinforced 
by the following characteristics observed in centralised clearing: 
the concentration of activity at the level of the CCP and of members; 
and the high interconnections, owing to the presence of common 
members. The failure of a CCP may, therefore, expose the system 
to high losses if the risks are not appropriately managed. 
Chart B shows the market share of the main CCPs in the swaps 
segment, on the basis of currencies and geographical areas.
Operations are essentially concentrated in LCH.Clearnet Ltd, 
with the exception of activity in Latin America (CME Clearing 
(US)) and in yen (JSCC (JP)). This tendency is also observed in 
the CDSs segment, where ICE Clear US is predominant. 
From the members’ standpoint, 75% of activity is concentrated in 
around 20 entities (most of them banks). Chart C shows, for the 
swaps segment, the percentage of the aggregate initial margin 
(a proxy of activity) deposited by the five biggest members of the 
three CCPs most active in this segment. This percentage ranges 
from 24% to 69%. Chart E shows the high presence of banks in 
relation to the other clearing members. 
The risk entailed for a CCP of being highly exposed to certain 
members is mitigated by the internationally recommended 
requirement. This stipulates that the guarantee fund should be of 
a size equivalent, at least, to the losses that might be generated by 
the member with the highest exposure in extreme but plausible 
market conditions.4 
SOURCES: BIS (Semiannual Derivative Statistics), Clarus FT, CPMI-IOSCO (Quantitative disclosure 2018 Q3), ISDA.
a Swap data also include FRAs. The data for 2016-2018 were extracted from the BIS. Data prior to 2016 were estimated by indexing the rate of change of the 
percentages reported by ISDA to the data reported by the BIS. The series were adjusted by the possible double counting of BIS data.
b Swap data also include FRAs.
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Chart A
OTC DERIVATIVES CLEARED THROUGH CCPs
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Chart B
VOLUMES CLEARED BY CCPs IN THE SWAP SEGMENT, BY CURRENCY 
AND GEOGRAPHICAL AREA. Percentage of market share (2018) (b)
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Chart C
INITIAL NET INTEREST INCOME DEPOSITED BY THE FIVE LARGEST MEMBERS. 
SWAP SEGMENT. 2018 Q3 (b)
%
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
CME (US) JSCC (JP) LCH Ltd (UK)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
NUMBER OF MEMBERS % BANKS (right-hand scale)
Chart D
BANKS AS CLEARING MEMBERS. SWAP SEGMENT. 2018 Q3 (b)
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4  In the globally systemic CCPs, the size of the fund should be big 
enough to cover the losses of the two biggest members.
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BOX 2.2 CENTRAL CLEARINg COUNTERPARTIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY (cont’d)
CCPs are, by their nature, entities that are highly interconnected to 
the rest of the financial system. True, CCPs can link up with one 
another through interoperability agreements; but these are scarce 
in practice. That said, there is a notably high presence of common 
members and services providers, some of which globally systemic 
banks (G-SIBs). In particular, the 26 main CCPs (domiciled in 15 
jurisdictions) are, generally, exposed to at least 10 G-SIBs. 
Centralised clearing has the potential to strengthen financial 
stability. However, it poses elements of systemic risk that must be 
addressed. Given this concern, regulators have expended 
considerable effort in reinforcing the soundness and resilience of 
CCPs. Recently, the focus has been on developing robust recovery 
and resolution arrangements to mitigate the impact that the 
potential failure of a CCP would have on financial stability. 
